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Abstract
We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic,
stochastic environment when the government cannot change the tax rule as
uncertainty resolves. Due to such a stationarity constraint, our taxation prob-
lem is reduced to a static one over an expanded type space that incorporates
type evolution. We strengthen the argument in the static model that the zero
top marginal tax rate result is of little practical importance because it only
applies to the top of the expanded type space. If the maximal type increases
over time, the person with top ability in any period but the last has a positive
marginal tax rate.
JEL classification: H21
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1 Introduction
Since theNewDynamic Public Financewas inaugurated, progress has beenmade
in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This
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agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal
income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.1
Dynamic tax rules are in eect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have pri-
vate information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income
tax rule is generally complicated: it is non-stationary and depends on the entire
history of income declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether
governments can implement such complex tax rules becausemaking tax rules time-
dependent and tracking histories of income would entail large administrative and
compliance costs. Indeed, neither of our governments (i.e., the US and Japanese
governments) is tracking income histories for labor income taxation.
In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance
literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government
faces a stationarity constraint that the tax rule cannot be changed over time. That
is, the government can use only stationary tax rules. Moreover, stationarity of
tax rule implies that the tax cannot depend on histories of income. Indeed, the
government using a stationary tax rule can look at only current incomes, just as it
can only look at current incomes in the initial period. Naturally, we also assume
that the government makes a full commitment to its (stationary) tax rule. That is,
once the tax rule is determined in the initial period, the government cannot switch
to another stationary tax rule afterwards. We are assuming that such commitment
is not only possible, but perhaps unavoidable, due to political deadlock over the
issue of tax policy, as in the US right now.2 Thus, we may interpret our planner’s
problem on a politician’s short time-scale. Although our assumptions might be
extreme, we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about what
the optimal dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax rules is limited to
ones that are feasible in practice. Moreover, as we shall discuss below, stationarity
brings with it tractability.
We consider a finite horizon discrete time model in which the government
would like to maximize the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function. Our
economy is heterogeneous, as we begin with a non-trivial exogenous type dis-
1See Kocherlakota (2010) for an overview of this literature.
2Indeed, the US government has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 1986.
The Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its income tax system in a major
way since 2007. Therefore, once the tax systems are fixed, they persist for some time.
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tribution where type here is people’s earning ability.3 People’s type is subject to
stochastic shocks in each period. We focus on idiosyncratic first-order Markov
shocks that are i.i.d. among people. Regarding intertemporal resource alloca-
tion, we assume that the government can save or borrow from an outside party.
However, we assume that agents cannot save or borrow, and hence focus on labor
income taxation (i.e., capital income taxation is excluded). We shall discuss this
assumption next.
Although the no saving assumption is strong for dynamic models, it is not un-
common in the NDPF literature.4 A model that is consistent with this assumption
is obtained from primitives when we assume quasi-linear utility (linear in con-
sumption good) and the discount and interest rates coincide. In this case, if we tax
savings at all, nobody saves because people are indierent aboutwhen to consume,
and there is no revenue from taxing savings. The tax then becomes a labor income
tax. A quasi-linear utility function is consistent with the assumptions we shall use.
Aside from the quasi-linear case, the no saving result would apply if the discount
factor is suciently small, as long as the marginal utility of consumption good at
zero consumption is bounded as in, for example, a separable, concave, quadratic
utility function.
Although analytical characterization and evennumerical analysis of the optimal
dynamic tax system are dicult in general, we can analytically characterize the
optimal tax system because our problem can be reduced to a static one owing to
the stationarity of the tax rule.5 Specifically, this is because the tax rule depends
on only current income under the stationarity constraint and individual saving or
borrowing is not allowed, so we can regard an agent living for T periods, who has
a time-separable preference, as distinct agents in each period and for each shock
by appealing to the law of large numbers. Moreover, because the government can
save or borrow, the law of large numbers also implies a single aggregate resource
constraint. We can then directly apply the arguments for static models to our
3If we do not fix the initial type distribution, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty,
which is like a macro model. However, as long as we consider the equal-weight utilitarian social
welfare function, the distinction is not essential for the optimal tax rule as Farhi andWerning (2013)
illustrate.
4For example, Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Weinzierl (2011) make this assumption.
5Naturally, gaining tractability in this waywidens the analytical insights about optimal dynamic
income taxationwe could derive. For example, if we assumed quasi-linear utility, we could conduct
comparative static analysis as in Weymark (1987).
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model.
A famous result in static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal tax
rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However, we cast
doubt on its policy relevance. In our dynamic stochastic economy, the support of
types will move over time, and a direct application of the static arguments implies
that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of the expanded type space, or the union
of supports over time. As a result, we can consider a structure of type evolution
such that the zero top marginal tax result does not apply for periods before the last
period, and that the standard result applies at the last period. It has been argued
in static models that the zero top marginal tax rate result is not important because
the fraction of people who face a zero marginal tax rate is small, and our result
strengthens this. Indeed, if the time horizon is large, it is not really relevant.
The policy relevance of the zero top marginal tax rate result has also been
questioned from other perspectives. Diamond (1998) considers unbounded skill
distributions and shows that the asymptotic marginal tax rate is generally nonzero
(see also Diamond and Saez, 2011). Tuomala (1990, chapter 9) considers uncer-
tainties in income and type, respectively, and examines how the insurance motive
aects the optimal income tax. He numerically shows that, in either case, the
marginal tax rate is increasing in income up to the 99th percentile of the income
distribution. In their arguments, the zero top marginal tax result does not hold. In
our model, on the other hand, it does hold but only at the top of the expanded type
space.
The stationarity constraint has anon-negligible impact on equilibriumoutcomes
of new dynamic public finance models. Battaglini and Coate (2008), who consider
history-dependent non-stationary tax rules, show that the marginal tax rate is
zero if an agent is currently, or has at some point been, the top earner. Thus, an
individual who is the top earner in all periods faces a zero marginal tax rate in
every period. Evidently, their tax rule takes full advantage of the fact that it can be
history-dependent and non-stationary. In our model, as we have stated, such an
individual faces a zero marginal tax rate only in the terminal period. Moreover,
we observe that the structure of the stochastic shock can also have a non-negligible
impact. Because Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider a two-state Markov process,
the support of types is fixed over time. Thus, their result implies that the fraction
of people whose allocation is distorted vanishes as the time horizon increases. On
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the other hand, in our model, the support of types generally moves over time, and
all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
Regarding the past literature that is relevant to ourwork, one of themost general
treatments of optimal nonlinear income taxation in a dynamic, stochastic economy
is Kocherlakota (2005). In his model, both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
are present, and no restriction is imposed on the processes of shocks. Albanesi
and Sleet (2006) consider optimal taxation in a dynamic stochastic economy with
i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks. They show that the constrained-ecient allocation can
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with an indirect mechanism that
depends on only current wealth and current labor income. Battaglini and Coate
(2008), as we have already mentioned, consider a dynamic stochastic economy
where idiosyncratic shocks evolve as a two-state Markov process. Although the
stochastic structure is simplified, they address the eects of people’s risk attitude
and the time-consistency of the optimal tax rule.6
There has been some work that shares our motivation and studies tax rules that
are more realistic than fully optimal rules in dynamic economies. It has been found
that simple tax rules can achieve sizable welfare gains. Weinzierl (2011) considers
history-independent non-stationary tax rules, which he calls age-dependent tax
rules, in dynamic economies.7 He shows that, if an agent is the top earner in every
period, she faces no distortion in every period. On the contrary, in our stationary
case, the top of the expanded type space where no distortion arises is generally not
attained in any period except the last, even if an agent is always the top earner.
Golosov et al. (2013) study a realistic pension system in which the income tax is
history-independent and retirement benefits are inspired by the actual US system.
Farhi and Werning (2013) consider a life cycle model with idiosyncratic shocks
that evolve as a Markov process, and study history-independent non-stationary
tax rules. Compared to the work above, we consider an even simpler case where
the tax is stationary.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic
structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax
rule. Section 3 contains our conclusions and discusses subjects for future research.
6In a two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (2014) study a history-
dependent non-stationary tax rule while addressing time-consistency.
7Gaube (2010) also discusses age-dependent tax rules. Because his main interest lies in the
time-consistency of tax rules, he focuses on a two-period model.
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Proofs omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy
lasts for T+1 periods. In period 0, each agent is endowedwith typew0 2 W0  R++,
distributed with density function f 0. We view our model as a heterogeneous
economywhere the type distribution is f 0. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks
to the agents’ types in the subsequentperiods. Thedrawof the shock is independent
over agents. We assume that the type wt follows a first-order Markov process with
conditional density f t(wt+1 jwt). Let Wt = wt : 9wt 1 2 Wt 1; f t(wt jwt 1) > 0	. Wt is
the type space in period t. We assume that Wt is a non-degenerate closed interval
in R++. For later use, we also define the expanded type spaceW =
ST
t=0Wt. This is
also assumed to be a non-degenerate closed interval.
The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant re-
turns to scale in each period. In our model, type represents the earning ability of
agents. That is, if the labor supply of agent w is `, his gross income is given by
y = w`. As is usual in optimal taxation models, the agents face a trade-o between
consumption and leisure. The utility function is
U

fct; `tgTt=0

=
TX
t=0
tu(ct; `t) (1)
where `t 2 [0; 1] is labor in period t, ct is consumption in period t, and  > 0
is the discount factor. We assume that u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable
and strictly quasiconcave as well as increasing in c, and decreasing in `. More-
over, we make the standard assumptions that leisure 1   ` is a noninferior good8
and that the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property holds: 8(c; y;w) 2 R2+  W,
 wuc(c; y=w)=u`(c; y=w) is increasing in w.9
The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we
8Hellwig (2007) presents another assumption that is a cardinal property of u instead of the
assumption that leisure is a noninferior good, which is an ordinal property.
9This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the consumption good is a normal good. See
p. 182 of Mirrlees (1971).
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consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:
SW =
Z
W0
E
h
U

fct; yt=wtgTt=0
 w0i f 0(w0)dw0: (2)
where the conditional expectation is taken with respect to
f t(wt jw0) =
Z
Wt 1
f t(wt jwt 1) f t 1(wt 1 jwt 2)    f 1(w1 jw0)dwt 1dwt 2   dw1
for each t. Under the assumptions imposed on the one-period utility function, it
follows that redistribution is desirable using the utilitarian welfare function with,
if necessary, a twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and strictly concave
transformation of the one-period utility function (Hellwig, 2007, Corollary 3.2).
The planner would like to carry out redistribution through lump-sum income
taxes, but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to
design a mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types (i.e., it needs to
design an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism).
As is stated in the introduction, we assume that people cannot save or borrow,
and hence focus on labor income taxation (i.e., capital income taxation is excluded).
The government’s policy instrument in period t is then formally represented by
the income tax rule t : Rt ! R that maps the agent’s declared history of labor
incomes into the tax. The indirect mechanism is then summarized as a sequence
of income tax rules ftgTt=0. However, the planner faces a stationary constraint
for the income tax rule. To state our stationary constraint, we first focus on a
history-independent income tax rule, which is an income tax rule t such that, for any
yt = (y0; y1; :::; yt) 2 Rt and yˆt = (yˆ0; yˆ1; :::; yˆt) 2 Rt, t(yt) = t(yˆt) if yt = yˆt. Given a
history-independent income tax rule t, define a map ˆt : R ! R by ˆt(y) = t(yt)
where yt = (y0; y1; :::; yt) 2 Rt is arbitrary as long as yt = y. A stationary income tax
rule is a sequence of history-independent income tax rules ftgTt=0 such that ˆt = 
for all t for some map  : R ! R. A stationary income tax rule is identified with
the map  : R! R. Then, the stationarity constraint is that the planner must use a
stationary income tax rule when maximizing the social welfare.
Under a stationary tax rule, agents report their current incomes in each period.
Because there is no saving, ct = yt   (yˆ) if an agent earns yt and reports yˆ in period
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t under the stationary tax rule . In particular, the agent of type wwould earn
y(w) = argmax
y
u(y   (y); y=w): (3)
In general, incentive compatibility requires that the agent cannot be better o in
terms of his lifetime utility by deviating from the truthful reporting for all states
(i.e., reporting y(w) for allw 2 W). However, under aMarkov shock, wemay focus
on one-shot deviations in each period (See, e.g., Fernandes andPhelan, 2000). Then,
the IC constraint in period t is
8wt 2 Wt;u
 
y(wt)   (y(wt)); y
(wt)
wt
!
+
TX
s=t+1
E
"
s tu
 
y(ws)   (y(ws)); y
(ws)
ws
!
jwt
#
 u
 
y˜   (y˜); y˜
wt
!
+
TX
s=t+1
E
"
s tu
 
y(ws)   (y(ws)); y
(ws)
ws
!
jwt
#
for all y˜ 2 R: (4)
However, because the current report does not aect future utilities under a history-
independent tax rule, this is reduced to
8wt 2 Wt;u
 
y(wt)   (y(wt)); y
(wt)
wt
!
 u
 
y˜   (y˜); y˜
wt
!
for all y˜ 2 R: (5)
As a result, the IC constraint is given by the following single condition:
8w 2 W; u
 
y(w)   (y(w)); y
(w)
w
!
 u
 
y˜   (y˜); y˜
w
!
for all y˜ 2 R; (6)
which takes care of all periods.
Let c(w) = y(w)   (y(w)). Then, the condition above implies
8w 2 W; u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
 u
 
c(w0);
y(w0)
w
!
for all w0 2 W: (7)
The maps c : W ! R and y : W ! R, which we call a (stationary) allocation
rule, constitutes a direct mechanism where agents report their types rather than
incomes. Then, we have constructed an incentive compatible stationary allocation
rule from an incentive compatible stationary tax rule, which corresponds to the
revelation principle. However, now that the IC condition is reduced to a static one,
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the converse is also possible due to the taxation principle (Hammond, 1979). That
is, if an allocation rule (c; y) satisfies
8w 2 W;u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
 u
 
c(w0);
y(w0)
w
!
for all w0 2 W; (IC)
there exists a corresponding incentive compatible (stationary) income tax rule.
Therefore, we henceforth focus on allocation rule (c; y).
In addition to the IC constraint, the government faces a resource constraint: it
needs to finance G in units of consumption good through the tax. This revenue
could be used for a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the
public good could enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that
the government can borrow or save at rate . Because the income tax collected
from an agent reportingw is (w) = y(w) c(w), the government faces the following
resource constraint (RC):
G  E
2666664 TX
t=0
t
 
y(wt)   c(wt)3777775 : (RC)
Then, the planner’s problem is given by
max
c();y()
Z
W0
E
2666664 TX
t=0
tu
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
! w03777775 f 0(w0)dw0
s.t. (RC) and (IC).
(8)
We solve for the second-best allocation rule by using optimal control theory as
in Hellwig (2007). For reference, the first-best allocation rule maximizes the utili-
tarian welfare function subject to the resource constraint only, assuming that the
government knows the type of each agent at each time.
Before proceeding, let us summarize the regularity conditionswehave imposed:
Assumption 1 (Regularity conditions).
1. An agent’s type follows a first-orderMarkov processwith conditional density f t(wt+1 jwt)
such that Wt and W are non-degenerate closed intervals in R++;
2. u(c; `) is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly quasiconcave as well as increasing
in c, and decreasing in `; leisure 1   ` is a noninferior good; and u(c; `) satisfies the
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Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property.
Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (8), we exploit
the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history,
and we consider a time-separable utility function and the utilitarian social welfare
function. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is expanded to
PT
t=0 
t. That is, each person in each period is
considered to be a dierent person in the static model, though the mass of agents
in period t is compressed to t owing to the planner’s discounting. Utilitarianism
with time-separable utility gives us the equivalence.10 Then, we take the standard
approach for static optimal income taxation problems to solve the problem (8).
That is, we consider a relaxed problem in which the IC constraints are replaced
with weaker conditions that address only downward deviations and invoke the
fact that a solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the original problem.
Let w = minW and w = maxW (thus, W = [w;w]). The main properties of the
planner’s allocation rule are then summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that people cannot save or borrow.
Then, 0(y(w)) = 0 and if y(w) is strictly increasing at w = w, 0(y(w)) = 0. Moreover, if
y(w) > 0, then 0(y(w)) 2 (0; 1) for any w 2 (w;w).
Proof. See Appendix. 
The proposition states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of W and if
income is strictly increasing at the bottom of W, the marginal tax rate is also zero
there. On the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more than
0 but less then 1 in the interior ofW.
Suppose that y(w) is strictly increasing at w. By Proposition 1, as long as
everyone works so that y(w) > 0 for all w 2 W, the marginal tax rate is zero only
at the top and bottom of the expanded type space W. Thus, being the top earner
in each period generally does not imply that his marginal tax rate is zero in every
period. In particular, suppose that the type space monotonically expands over
time (or maxWt increases and minWt decreases over time). For example, suppose
T = 2;W0 = [3; 4], and wt+1 = wt+ swhere s is uniformly distributed over [ 1; 1] for
10The properties of the second-best tax rules we derive are robust to, while the desirability of
redistribution is unaected by, a time-independent, twice continuously dierentiable, increasing,
and strictly concave transformation of instantaneous utilities.
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t  0. In that case, we have W1 = [2; 5] and W2 = [1; 6]. Then, no one’s marginal tax
rate is zero in the first T periods nor the last period except when the type of an individual
reaches w = maxW or w = minW in the last period. That is, the zero top marginal
rate result does not apply for periods before time T, and the standard result applies
at time T. If T is large, this never really happens.
It is useful to compare our result with the history-independent non-stationary
tax studied by Weinzierl (2011). Under no individual saving or borrowing, it is
shown that, if an agent is the top earner in every period, then he faces a zero
marginal tax rate in every period. This generally does not hold for our stationary
case because maxW is not necessarily attained in every period even if an agent is
the top earner in every period.11
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the results above are in sharp contrast
with those of Battaglini andCoate (2008) inwhich the shock follows aMarkov chain
over two states (high and low). Under their tax rule, the allocation is distorted only
when people’s type is currently and has always been low. That is, the allocations
of agents who are currently, or have at some point been, high types are first-best.
Therefore, the fraction of people whose allocations are distorted is decreasing over
timewhereas, in ourmodel, the allocation is distorted anywhere in the interior ofW
as long as income is positive.12 Their results crucially depend on the following facts:
the support of types is discrete and fixed over time, and the tax rule can depend on
history.13 In our model, the support of types is continuous and generally changes
over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current income. As a result, all
people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.
3 Conclusion
We consider the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a gov-
ernment that cannot change the tax rule over time. Because of the stationarity
constraint, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically character-
11Although the result is shown for the deterministic case, Weinzierl (2011) shows that making the
wagepath stochastic does not change the qualitative results as long as the tax is history-independent.
See the technical appendix of that paper.
12Whether the allocation is distorted at the top depends on the utility function. For example, if
the utility function is quasi-linear, the allocation is first-best at the top.
13Note that they also do not allow saving or borrowing.
11
ize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax result is of
little importance in practice because it only applies to the top of the expanded type
space that incorporates type evolution. For example, if we consider type spaces
that monotonically expand over time, we ensure a positive marginal tax rate for
the top type except in the last period.14
The most prominent of all crucial assumptions is that agents are not allowed to
save. If agents could save, the government no longer would have control over their
consumption and asset holdings. Hence, the allocation rule would specify before-
and after-tax incomes for each type history in each period, while agents privately
choose their paths of consumption and asset holding. However, in the presence
of the saving, the stationarity of the tax rule does not necessarily imply that of the
allocation rule. Hence, our analytical trick here (i.e., reducing the problem to a
static one) does not apply. Nonetheless, it is quite interesting and important to see
how the stationarity of the tax rule aects the second-best allocation. How much
eciency loss results from the stationarity restriction?
Regarding the stationarity of the tax rule, wehavemade an extreme assumption:
the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its tax rates
cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider the
situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or look at
past histories at some cost.
Moreover, because we considered idiosyncratic shocks that are i.i.d. among
agents, we could obtain a single resource constraint by invoking the law of large
numbers. Besides the stationarity of the tax rule, this was also crucial for our
results. In fact, if the agents face common aggregate shocks, their types will be
correlated with each other, and the analytical approach of this paper will fail to
apply. These should be subjects of future research.
Finally, although we characterized an optimal tax rule, we did not address its
existence. This can probably be proved using the results of Berliant and Page (2001)
for static optimal income taxes.
14In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon model. Technically speaking, we use optimal control
theory, so by replacing terminal conditions with transversality conditions, we would be able to
extend Proposition 1 to an infinite-horizon model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that, due to the stationarity constraint, our problem
canbe reduced to a static problemand then invoke the results ofHellwig (2007)who
analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare function.
As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC constraint
with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:
8w 2 W; u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
 u
 
c(w0);
y(w0)
w
!
for all w0 2 fw˜ 2 W : w˜  wg : (IC0)
Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward deviations. By
Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), (y(); c()) with nondecreasing c() satisfies (IC0) if and
only if du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w for all w 2 W. Thus, when we solve the
problem, we impose the constraints that c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw 
du(c(w);y(w)=w0)
dw0 jw0=w onW instead of the downward IC constraint.
Next, we rewrite the welfare function asZ
W0
E
2666664 TX
t=0
tu
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
! w03777775 f 0(w0)dw0 = TX
t=0
t
Z
Wt
u
 
c(wt);
y(wt)
wt
!
f t(wt)dwt
where f t(wt) =
R
Wt 1 f
t(wt jwt 1) f t 1(wt 1 jwt 2)    f 0(w0)dwt 1dwt 2   dw0. Let f t be
an extension of f t to W (i.e., f t(w) = f t(w) on Wt and f t(w) = 0 on W nWt). Then,
the above expression reduces toZ
W
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
g(w)dw (9)
where g(w)  PTt=0 t f t(w). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to
G 
Z
W
 
y(w)   c(w) g(w)dw: (10)
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Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by
max
x(  )
Z
W
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
g(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W
 
y(w)   c(w) g(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w on W:
(11)
On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation
problem. Specifically, in our notation, his problem is written as
max
x(  )
Z
W0
u
 
c(w);
y(w)
w
!
f 0(w)dw
s.t. G 
Z
W0
 
y(w)   c(w) f 0(w)dw;
c(w) is nondecreasing and du(c(w);y(w)=w)dw  du(c(w);y(w)=w
0)
dw0 jw0=w on W0:
(12)
Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the
total mass of agents is
PT
t=0 
t, the support of type distribution isW, and the welfare
weight for type w is g(w), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly
apply. In particular, our claim follows from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig
(2007). 
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